Polarized Ukraine 2014: Opinion and Territorial Split Demonstrated with
  the Bounded Confidence XY Model, Parameterized by Twitter Data by Romenskyy, Maksym et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
6.
00
41
9v
2 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  2
5 J
ul 
20
18
Polarized Ukraine 2014: Opinion and Territorial Split Demonstrated with the
Bounded Confidence XY Model, Parameterized by Twitter Data
Maksym Romenskyy
Department of Life Sciences, Imperial College London, London SW7 2AZ, UK and
Department of Mathematics, Uppsala University, Box 480, Uppsala 75106, Sweden
Viktoria Spaiser
School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK
Thomas Ihle
Institute of Physics, University of Greifswald, Felix-Hausdorff-Str. 6, Greifswald 17489, Germany
Vladimir Lobaskin
School of Physics, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland
(Dated: July 26, 2018)
Multiple countries have recently experienced extreme political polarization, which in some cases
led to escalation of hate crime, violence and political instability. Beside the much discussed presi-
dential elections in the United States and France, Britain’s Brexit vote and Turkish constitutional
referendum, showed signs of extreme polarization. Among the countries affected, Ukraine faced
some of the gravest consequences. In an attempt to understand the mechanisms of these phe-
nomena, we here combine social media analysis with agent-based modeling of opinion dynamics,
targeting Ukraine’s crisis of 2014. We use Twitter data to quantify changes in the opinion divide
and parameterize an extended Bounded-Confidence XY Model, which provides a spatiotemporal
description of the polarization dynamics. We demonstrate that the level of emotional intensity is a
major driving force for polarization that can lead to a spontaneous onset of collective behavior at
a certain degree of homophily and conformity. We find that the critical level of emotional intensity
corresponds to a polarization transition, marked by a sudden increase in the degree of involvement
and in the opinion bimodality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ukraine represents a bright example of a nearly
evenly split society with two opposing camps, where
the East/South gravitates towards Russia while the
West/North towards European neighbors [1]. The over-
all political vector in the country sways between politi-
cal parties and leaders that on the one side seek closer
ties to the West and in particular Europe and on the
other hand to the East and in particular Russia. The Or-
ange Revolution in 2004 brought pro-western politicians
to power, however, in the 2010 elections a pro-eastern
politician, Viktor Yanukovych, was elected for president,
not least because of major support in the eastern re-
gions of Ukraine (see Fig. 1). In November 2013, af-
ter Yanukovych failed to sign a political association and
free trade agreement with the European Union, protests
in Ukraine erupted. The initially peaceful rallies became
violent in January 2014 after the government passed laws
to suppress the protests. In February 2014, the violence
escalated, which led to the removal of Yanukovych from
office by the parliament. Meanwhile a separatist and
anti-interim-government movement rose with the sup-
port of Russia in eastern and southern parts of Ukraine,
and ignited a military conflict. Crimea was annexed by
the Russian Federation after a referendum that was de-
nounced internationally as illegitimate and illegal. Later
in 2014, the crisis resulted in further territorial separa-
tion with over 2.6 million internally displaced persons
and refugees and a formation of self-proclaimed states in
Donetsk and Luhansk [2]. These events escalated the po-
larization in the country that has grown over the years.
As the two political sides became more extreme in their
views in the course of the events a dialogue and there-
fore a peaceful solution has become increasingly difficult.
The extreme opinion divide affected not only society as
a whole but also destabilized multiple families and local
communities.
In this paper, we present a novel approach, in which
we combine rich social media data with the power of
methods of statistical physics, to study political opin-
ion polarization mechanisms, seeking to understand what
mechanisms turned Ukraine into a irreconcilably polar-
ized state. Though the integration of the two approaches
has been increasingly discussed [5, 6], there are only few
studies so far that have actually attempted to combine
these [7–11]. None of them, however, studies polariza-
tion and integrates the unstructured data analysis com-
prehensively with the computational model. In the past
studies there has been a methodological gap between the
social media analysis and agent-based modeling, which
has limited the relation between the two to rather qual-
itative statements. We are presenting an approach here
that elaborately links the two approaches. Combining
them has the advantage to parameterize the computa-
tional model and validate it by empirical evidence and
2Figure 1: (A) Ukraine’s political divide in 2010 elections [3]. The majority of the voters in the eastern and southern regions of
Ukraine supported a pro-eastern candidate, Viktor Yanukovych. (B) Ukraine’s linguistic divide according to national census
2001 [4]. In the three regions most affected by Ukraine crisis in 2014, Luhansk oblast, Donetsk oblast and Crimea, Russian is
a native language for more than 50% of the population.
on the other hand to make use of the rich social media
data in a theory-guided way beyond mere descriptives.
This holds the potential to gain new insights into the
underlying social mechanisms of polarization. In the fol-
lowing, we will describe a new computational model of
polarization, a 2D lattice agent-based model, that is in-
formed by the theoretical work on polarization discussed
below and that brings in the spatial dimension and em-
phasizes the role of regional differences. We then look
at the empirical polarization dynamics in the Ukrainian
Twittersphere, before parameterizing the model with the
analyzed Twitter data, hereby validating the model. The
combination of the two approaches reveals the important
role that emotional intensity levels play in polarization
thus far not sufficiently accounted for by classical the-
oretical or empirical studies of polarization. The few
studies that investigate the role of emotions in polar-
ization have usually focussed on very specific emotions,
e.g. “self-conscious” emotions like pride and embarrass-
ment/shame and showed that these emotions can rein-
force conformity and polarization [12]. In this paper, we
do not focus on specific emotions, but, rather examine
the role of emotional intensity levels and show how these
emotional intensity levels can be a decisive driver in po-
larization.
II. OPINION POLARIZATION
Opinion polarization has been intensely studied over
the last few decades, initiated by the observation that
groups tend to adopt positions that are more extreme
than the initial individual positions of its members
[13, 14]. One explanation of this phenomenon is based on
the Social Comparison Theory, which suggests that peo-
ple want to be perceived in a more favorable way than
what we perceive to be the average tendency. Through
observations they determine what the average tendency
is and then they express a slightly more extreme opinion
than the perceived average opinion [13, 15, 16]. There
is clear evidence for this assumption from numerous ex-
perimental studies [13, 17, 18]. Moreover, due to the ho-
mophily phenomenon [19], which states that people are
more likely to interact with those who are similar to them
with respect to socio-economic background [20] as well as
attitudes [21], people are more likely to socially compare
themselves to similar peers. Group polarization phenom-
ena are also explained drawing on the Persuasive Argu-
ment Theory, which states that people are more likely to
change their opinion when presented with persuasive ar-
guments. Group polarization can occur when the group
discourse is manipulated through biased information or
misinformation, exposing a group to false persuasive ar-
guments [13, 16, 22]. The theory is strongly supported
by empirical evidence from numerous experimental stud-
ies [13, 23, 24]. The two mechanisms, social comparison
and persuasive argument usually co-occur. For instance,
persuasive arguments in an environment of biased infor-
mation can further push an individual to adopt a more
extreme attitude than expressed in the group they com-
pare themselves to. Another mechanism with respect to
polarization dynamics is the Biased Assimilation [25] in
opinion formation processes, which maintains that peo-
ple are likely to keep their original position and draw
support for it if confronted with mixed or inconclusive
arguments. This mechanism, which again is empirically
well established [26–28], shows that people are only to a
limited extent open to change their opinions and this can
contribute to polarization dynamics. In fact, Dandekar et
al. [21] show that the two earlier described mechanisms
3and in particular the social comparison mechanism, is not
sufficient to produce polarization, the biased assimilation
mechanism has to be added.
Polarization processes have been empirically investi-
gated through experimental studies as mentioned previ-
ously and to a lesser extent through survey based stud-
ies [29, 30]. Furthermore, applied statistical physics
and agent-based modeling approaches [21, 31–33] have
been used extensively to study polarization mechanisms
through computer simulations. Prominent are for in-
stance bounded confidence models of opinion dynamics,
stochastic models for the evolution of continuous-valued
opinions within a finite group of individuals that explore
conditions for consensus and opinion fragmentation, in-
troduced by Deffuant et al. [34] and further elaborated
by numerous studies [35–37]. We will draw inspiration
from these models as well. The challenges of using sta-
tistical physics models for modeling social phenomena are
known. The tractable models are usually oversimplified
and too general and thus lack flexibility required to reflect
the features of a particular social phenomena. Moreover,
while computational studies are rigorous in investigat-
ing the specific mechanisms and dynamics of polarization
they often lack empirical foundation and thus it remains
often unclear to what extent these often abstract mod-
els accurately represent phenomena we see in real world.
More recently, social media (e.g. Twitter and Facebook)
data have been increasingly used to study opinion polar-
ization [38–41]. Gruzd and Tsyganova [42], for instance,
use Ukrainian Vkontakte data to demonstrate the split
between the two political camps in Ukraine (pro-East vs.
pro-West) during the Maidan protests. Twitter has also
played a quite important role as a contested public de-
bate arena throughout the crisis in Ukraine [4, 5]. Stud-
ies with social media data have revealed the strong effect
of homophily in online social networks, which may lead
to phenomena like the echo chamber [41, 45, 46], where
opinions are amplified through communication and repe-
tition inside an “enclosed” social system. Echo chambers
can prevent people from noticing contrary persuasive ar-
guments and they skew the perceived average that people
take into consideration in social comparison processes.
Though social media data is potentially rich, i.e. fine-
grained, time-resolved, relational, geo-coded, etc., with-
out an explicit theoretical underpinning, the studies of
polarization on social media remain usually rather de-
scriptive. By combining rich social media data with the
power of methods of statistical physics a better under-
standing of specific political opinion polarization mecha-
nisms is sought in this paper.
III. METHODS
A. Political opinion mining of Twitter data
We used the archived Twitter API Streaming data
from October 2013 to September 2014 provided by the
Archive Team [47]. The archived data is the freely avail-
able Twitter Streaming API Spritzer Sample, which col-
lects 1% of all public tweets in real-time. The Twitter
Streaming API Spritzer Sample allows for unfiltered data
analysis and hence for capturing the full discourse picture
comparing to a more narrow, focussed (e.g. based on cer-
tain hashtags, user networks etc.) approach facilitated by
data using the Twitter REST API [48] that would disre-
gard discourse contributions beyond the specified search
queries. The data for January 2014 was missing and we
did not find any other archive providing this data. The
tweet data is stored in JSON format. The data was pro-
cessed and analyzed in Python. Specifically, the data was
filtered for Russian/Ukrainian language (excluding Twit-
ter users who specified being from Russia), cleared of
SPAM, and then filtered for political content with an ex-
tensive set of keywords (see the electronic supplementary
material for details). We used the tweets to determine
the political affiliation of each Twitter user using a set of
keywords indicating neutral, pro- or anti-West attitudes
and a set of keywords indicating neutral, pro- or anti-
Russian attitudes (see the electronic supplementary ma-
terial for details). Moreover, we conducted a sentiment
analysis of the tweets, in order to determine the political
affiliation for previously seemingly neutral Twitter users.
For this purpose we utilized the SentiStrength system for
automatic sentiment analysis, built an Ukrainian sen-
timent words dictionary (see the electronic supplemen-
tary material) and extended the SentiStrength Russian
sentiment words dictionary to make it equivalent to the
Ukrainian sentiment words dictionary (see the electronic
supplementary material for details). Our classification
algorithm scanned all tweets for each user and checked
whether the tweet contained any of the keywords and any
of the sentiment words specified and calculated overall
scores for political “West” and “East” affiliation as well
as sentiment scores (see the electronic supplementary ma-
terial for details). For the geo-plots in Fig. 3C,D, we fo-
cused on the data of the last week in September 2014. We
scanned the Twitter data of each user for two possible ge-
ographical information, the value of their “location” tag
and/or geo/place “coordinates” tag which is a latitude
and a longitude coordinate value. The vast majority of
users have the default option “geo enabled:false”, thus do
not provide precise geographical information attached to
the tweet, a few more provide profile “location” informa-
tion, but overall, geographical data is often not specified
and thus missing. We therefore ended up with only 493
Twitter users for whom we had a geographical informa-
tion. The “West” and “East” political affiliation scores
of these 493 Twitter users were plotted in Fig. 3C,D (see
the electronic supplementary material for details).
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Figure 2: (A) Time series plot of number of tweets, in total, neutral and emotional. (B) Time series plot of emotional/neutral
tweets ratio with key political events tags. (C) Time series plot of number of average (weekly) users’ opinions, in total, pro-
West and pro-East. (D) Average weekly number of tweets per user. No data was available for January 2014 (see Materials and
Methods and the electronic supplementary material) therefore the data gaps in plots A-D between the weeks 13 and 17.
B. Bounded Confidence XY Model of Opinion
Polarization
We model opinion dynamics in an assembly of inter-
active agents placed on a two-dimensional lattice of fi-
nite size, which emulates a regional opinion distribution
and localization. Each opinion is represented by a vector
that can freely rotate in plane, similar to that in the XY
model of a magnet, and is characterized by the length p
(emotional intensity, i.e. fervent strength of an opinion)
and polar angle θ (orientation). This allows us to model
a continuous opinion spectrum with respect to the speci-
fied direction by a cosine of the angle between the vectors,
which can vary in the range between -1 (agent opposes
the opinion) and 1 (agent fully supports the opinion).
Each agent can interact with a fixed number of nearest
neighbors. The social interactions are introduced via lo-
cal mean field, similar to the Vicsek model [49]: the new
orientation of each vector is calculated as a mean of the
average direction of the neighbors and agent’s own ori-
entation:
θi(t+∆t) = tan
−1
[
1
N
∑
j,|j−i|≤r pj sin(θj(t))∑
j,|j−i|≤r pj cos(θj(t))
]
+ ξ(η, t),
(1)
where N is the number of interacting agents, ξ is the
angular noise variable uniformly distributed in the inter-
val [−η/2, η/2] and η is the noise strength. The noise is
added to model the level of conformity of the individual:
zero noise, η = 0 corresponds to full conformity, η = 2pi
allows an individual to deviate from the group opinion
by an unlimited value. A contribution of each interact-
ing agent is weighted by the emotional intensity of its
opinion p. The interaction has a limited range r, which
sets the number of nearest neighbors considered. In 2D,
interaction range r = 2 corresponds to 24 interaction
peers, r = 3 gives 48 peers, etc (see the electronic sup-
plementary material for details). In addition to this, the
interaction is selective so that the vectors align only with
those neighbors, whose orientation (opinion) deviates by
an angle less than some fixed value α from their own
opinion vector. This rule is inspired by the bounded con-
fidence model, or Deffuant model [34], and allows one to
imitate systems with different levels of opinion tolerance
[50]. Scaled value α/pi denotes a fraction of the opinion
spectrum that is taken into account by each individual,
e.g. α/pi = 0.1 corresponds to 10% closest opinions taken
into account. Note that our model does not explicitly in-
clude any intrinsic preference to agent’s own opinion (i.e.
orientation of the opinion vector i in the previous time
step) because using a relatively small values of η and α
already allows to achieve a socially realistic behavior.
We model a finite system with the boundary condi-
tions set by two fixed rows of agents on each side. The
boundary vectors are fixed according to the following
scheme: the left and upper rows are oriented to the left
(θ = pi), imitating a bias towards “West” and the right
and bottom rows are fixed to point in the opposite di-
5rection (θ = 0), thus mimicking a bias towards “East”.
When other agents interact with the boundary vectors
this introduces a spatially dependent local bias that can
account for geographical inhomogeneity in opinions, thus
imitating cultural or ethnic differences, information bias,
etc. (see the electronic supplementary material for de-
tails; see also the interactive model [51]).
These model settings reflect the theoretical assump-
tions about polarization described above. The orien-
tation represents political attitudes and the local mean
field calculation of new orientations for each agent rep-
resents the social comparison theory assumptions. The
homophily effect is included through the bounded confi-
dence feature, where agents align only with those neigh-
bors, whose political orientation is similar to their own.
Furthermore, the biased assimilation mechanism is re-
flected in the noise variable that determines the agents’
willingness to change opinion (conformity level). Finally,
the persuasive argument theory assumption, in particular
with respect to the contribution of biased information to
polarization, is simulated via the boundary conditions.
We have added a further parameter to our model, the
emotional intensity, i.e. vector length, that represents
the level of emotional strength and vehemence of a po-
litical opinion. This parameter reflects results we have
obtained from Twitter data sentiment analysis discussed
in the next sections. It also builds on recent computa-
tional models and big data analysis of opinion dynamics
[52, 53], which showcase the importance of emotions, and
in particular of negative emotions, for people’s engage-
ment in political debates and for opinion formations and
changes.
We modeled evolution of the opinion spectrum in the
described system starting from randomized initial distri-
butions of agents’ emotional intensity and orientations
based on general uniform distributions. The emotional
intensity levels for each agent were kept fixed in each sim-
ulation while the orientations evolved due to noise and
interactions. For each opinion spectrum extracted from
Twitter data, we performed a simulation until a steady
state was reached. After that, the following statistics
were collected: steady state distribution of the opinion
along the “East-West” scale, as defined by the boundary
conditions, mean order parameter, and bimodality index.
We should note here that in this setup the week-by-
week series of calculated properties do not reflect the real
time, nor the actual system’s dynamics as the history of
the individuals as well as previous steady states are ig-
nored. To follow the variation of collective properties,
ideally one should look at the evolution of each user’s
opinion and derive the group behavior from the corre-
sponding statistics. For this purpose, one would need
to either parameterize the individual opinions from the
empirical data directly or solve the inverse problem and
introduce the variation of opinions based on the instan-
taneous statistical averages. As we could reach only a
random sample of the tweets, it was not possible to follow
the former route and track individual users. The empir-
ical data we have are discontinuous. Moreover, we have
no appropriate model for individual psychology. There-
fore, we decided not to introduce an artificial evolution
of the opinions. As the individual history is lost, we can
only follow the variation of the averages corresponding
to the snapshot of Twitter data.
C. Model parameterization with Twitter data
To parameterize the Bounded confidence XY model we
used weekly distributions of the overall users’ emotional
intensity scores. For each week, the overall emotional
intensity of each user was defined from the mean of the
average sentiment scores on a continuous scale from 0
to 5, with 0 corresponding to a neutral average user’s
opinion and 5 reflecting an extremely emotional average
opinion. This measure did not contain any information
about political affiliation, so that each non-zero value
could correspond to either pro-West or pro-East user’s
political attitude. The data was sampled with a bin size
of 1 for all non-zero opinions and a resulting discrete dis-
tribution was normalized by the total number of users
per week giving probabilities for each discrete value of
overall emotional intensity (0 to 5). This distribution
was then applied to the simulated system to define the
length p of each opinion vector. In each simulation, val-
ues of p were assigned to agents at random, according
to obtained discrete weekly distributions of overall emo-
tional intensity, and kept constant throughout the simu-
lation. The simulated system consisted of 14641 agents
placed in nodes of 120 × 120 lattice. We performed at
least 106 update cycles to determine the structure of the
steady state. Each statistics was averaged over at least
5 independent runs. We computed the bimodality coef-
ficient as β = (γ2 + 1)/k, where γ is the skewness and k
is the kurtosis of weekly distributions of average opinion
scores in Twitter data or weekly distributions of cosines
of orientations θ of opinion vectors in simulations.
IV. RESULTS
A. Opinion Polarization in the Ukrainian
Twittersphere
To validate the model assumptions, we used Twitter
Streaming data from October 2013 to September 2014
provided by the Archive Team. We use Twitter data be-
cause it provides fine-grained, time-series and rich data
on recent political opinion dynamics in Ukraine, other-
wise not available. To determine the political affiliation
of the Twitter users in our data, we used a political affilia-
tion classification procedure based on keyword and senti-
ment analysis suggested and tested by Spaiser et al. [54]
(see the electronic supplementary material for details).
As a result, every Twitter user was assigned two scores,
a “West” score and an “East” score, representing their
6Figure 3: (A) Pro-against-European (West)/pro-against-Russian (East) opinion space plot for the first week of October 2013.
(B) Pro-against-European (West)/pro-against-Russian (East) opinion space plot for the second week of August 2014. The
points in plots C and D are Twitter users based on their two scores, the orange dot is the average. (C) Twitter users (dots)
colored according to their “East” affiliation score and plotted over the Ukraine map using Twitter geo, place or location
information. (D) Twitter users (dots) colored according to their “West” affiliation score and plotted over the Ukraine map
using Twitter geo, place or location information.
political position in a pro-against-European (West)/pro-
against-Russian (East) opinion space (see Fig. 3A,B) and
an emotional intensity score, combining their sentiment
analysis scores.
Our Twitter analyzes show that political polarization
did indeed take place in the Ukrainian Twittersphere be-
tween October 2013 and September 2014. Fig. 2A shows
a discontinuous increase in emotional users in February
2014, while the total number of users and the number of
neutral ones increased steadily. Fig. 2B depicts a ratio
of emotional/neutral opinions, where a jump from values
of about 1.0 to about 1.4 is visible around February as
well. We added to this figure the key political incidents
in Ukraine during this year, so the discontinuous changes
in the data can be related to actual political events. This
shows that the biggest discontinuous change in February
took place around the time when the Maidan protests
escalated and 100 people died on a single day. These re-
sults inspired the inclusion of emotional intensity levels
as a parameter in the computational model. In addition
to an abrupt increase in the total number of users (Figs.
2A,C), users’ involvement in the topic also changed dis-
continuously (Fig. 2D). The dynamics of the average
number of tweets per user completely resembles that of
the emotional level of tweets (Fig. 2B), with a charac-
teristic jump around week 19 (February 2014).
Fig. 3A,B moreover shows the polarization in a con-
tinuous two-dimensional space defined by pro-against-
European (West)/pro-against-Russian (East) scores.
This figure shows that the polarization resulted in ap-
pearance of two main opinion clusters, those who are
pro-East and against-the-West on the one side and those
who are against East but who are also quite critical of the
West on the other side (see the electronic supplementary
material for details). This in fact reflects most current
surveys that show the disappointment of many Western
oriented Ukrainians with the pro-West Poroshenko gov-
ernment [55].
Our Twitter data analysis confirms that political affil-
iation follows the expected geographical pattern. People
who are pro-East and against-West are more likely to be
located in the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine,
while Ukrainians with rather an against-East and (crit-
ical) pro-West attitude are to be found in the Western
and Northern territories (see Fig. 3C,D). This analysis
is a validation of our classification procedure, since the
geographical distribution of the Twitter users with their
respective political affiliation scores matches the actual
geographical political camp distributions in Ukraine (see
Fig. 1).
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Figure 4: (A)Time series plot of coefficient of bimodality of Twitter users’ opinion distribution. (B) Time series plot of
coefficient of bimodality of vector orientations in simulations (η = 0.12).
B. Validating the Bounded Confidence XY Model
of Opinion Polarization with Twitter data
To quantify the opinion divide, we present here the
bimodality index for the opinion spectrum (see Materi-
als and Methods for the definition), as we found it to be
most sensitive to the changes of the spectrum, therefore,
the best integral characteristic of the observed behavior.
The changes in the bimodality coefficient over 12 months
from October 2013 are shown in Fig. 4A,B. In the Twit-
ter data the bimodality keeps as low as 0.2 to 0.26 from
the start of observation until week 18 (February 2014) but
then demonstrates sudden increase to 0.35 to 0.40 within
the next two or three weeks, after which it stays high,
and the original value is never restored. This sudden
increase of the bimodality reflects a formation of two dis-
tinct political camps and clearly shows that the opinion
divide has suffered a significant deepening in this short
period. Moreover, we see that the deepening was non-
recoverable in the short term. The computational model,
parameterized with the Twitter emotional intensity spec-
trum for each respective week, captures this behavior well
and shows a similar qualitative trend. In a simulation
with α = 0.15pi, the bimodality coefficient jumps from
ca. 0.60 – 0.65 to 0.8 – 0.85 during the same period. The
quantitative difference in the values is mostly due to the
use of cosine function. We should note that, although
the model is parameterized by the Twitter data, it is
not bound to reproduce the distribution, as the vectors
are allowed to change the orientation, and this behav-
ior follows only from the specific anisotropic interactions
between the agents. We repeated the simulations with
a different interaction parameter α = 1.0, corresponding
to agents without any resistance to opinion change and
found no jump in the bimodality. Therefore, the opinion
divide is conditioned by both the restriction of confidence
and by conformity (noise) levels, thus confirming the ho-
mophily and biased assimilation assumptions. Moreover,
the drastic change in bimodality corresponds to the sud-
den increase of the emotional intensity, which we noted
in the data in Fig. 2B.
C. Onset of Opinion Clustering and Formation of
Territorial Domains
The increase in emotional intensity leads to important
consequences in the spatial dimension. In the weeks be-
fore and early at the outbreak of the crisis, the simula-
tions display large diversity of the opinions (Fig. 5C)
characterized by the large number (Fig. 5A) of small
(Fig. 5B) opinion domains (clusters). This picture,
however, changes further into the crisis, around week
19, when a smaller number of larger opinion domains
is formed. While clusters rarely exceed 100 agents before
the critical weeks 17-18, starting from week 19 we observe
clusters of up to 5000 agents and the numbers rarely drop
below 1000. That the behavior becomes expressly collec-
tive is consistent with the rise of emotional intensity and
of the fraction of involved agents (those with non-zero va-
lence), which increases the number of interactions within
each individual’s circle and thus the local aligning field.
This is further confirmed by Fig. 5F,G showing the po-
lar opinion histogram for the two critical time points,
week 18 and 19 obtained from simulation analyses. The
distributions are visibly gravitating towards 0 or 180 de-
grees (“East” and “West”) in both sets. The fraction of
neutral opinions drops from week 18 to week 19 and the
distribution of opinions in each subgroup becomes very
narrow.
Simulation analysis moreover shows that the opinion
divide induces also territorial splitting. Subfigures Fig.
5C,D show the in-plane opinion distribution. We plot-
ted the opinions as predicted by the model just before
the jump in the bimodality (week 18 – C) and immedi-
ately after that (week 19 – D). The change in the dis-
tribution between these points is dramatic: while the
predicted data for week 18 show a merely uniform dis-
8Figure 5: (A)Time series plot of average number of clusters in simulations. (B) Time series plot of maximal cluster size in
simulations. (C) Simulation snapshot for week 18, February 2014. (D) Simulation snapshot for week 19, February 2014. Each
square in plots C and D represents an individual agent; size of a square is proportional to emotional intensity; color of each
square denotes cosine of an orientation angle for each spin, with -1 and 1 corresponding to orientation towards “West” and
“East”, respectively. (E) Log-log plot of distribution of cluster sizes in simulations for week 18, February 2014 (blue) and
week 19, February 2014 (red). (F) Simulation cluster orientation diagram for week 18, February 2014. (G) Simulation cluster
orientation diagram for week 19, February 2014. Orientation of clusters in plots F and G is shown in degrees; 180 and 0
degrees denote orientation towards “West” and “East”, respectively; length of each bin reflects cluster probability. Simulation
parameters in plots A–G are α = 0.15 and η = 0.12.
tribution of both “East” and “West” orientations, the
picture for week 19 features two distinct clusters with
predominant “West” orientation in the lower left cor-
ner and domination of the “East” orientation in the top
right corner. These orientations correspond to vector di-
rections in the preset boundary conditions. Each do-
main contains practically no opposing opinion, as they
are squeezed out to the periphery and then to the op-
posing domain as the steady state develops. We can see
small islands of mixed/neutral opinion in the middle of
the simulation domain. The prediction of the territorial
divide matches also well the geo-location data shown in
Fig. 3C,D. We should stress however that the biased
boundary conditions alone are not sufficient to produce
any large domains even in the system with limited con-
fidence (Fig. 5C, see the electronic supplementary ma-
terial for details), although they definitely facilitate this
collective behaviour.
The simulation allows us to analyze the steady states
of the system and provides insights into the mechanisms
of sudden onset of polarization, clustering, and territo-
rial splitting (see the electronic supplementary material
for details). We in particular examined varying levels of
noise, restriction angles and vector lengths. High noise
(low conformity) corresponds to a globally disordered be-
haviour (without any prominent consensus or polariza-
tion) and the range of higher α allows only states with
polar order (global consensus). Smaller restriction an-
gles, α < 0.4pi, on the other hand produce regions of
prevalence of the bipolar states, thus structure the sys-
tem in a polar or bipolar way. A combination of small
restriction angle (strongly bounded confidence) and high
noise (low conformity) does not produce any global or-
der and is rather unrealistic since at these conditions the
system represents a set of selective but randomly vacil-
lating agents. Polarized states are generally only possible
at low noise (high conformity) and small restriction an-
gles (strongly bounded confidence). The changing level
of emotional intensity pushes the boundary between the
polarized and non-polarized societies moreover outwards,
thus extending the range of the polarized states, and
brings the originally weakly polarized society to a highly
polarized one. This splitting resembles in appearance a
phase separation in dissimilar liquids (e.g. oil in water).
The important difference of our system from the liquid
state systems is that the agents are not dissimilar from
the beginning but the dissimilarity and effective repul-
sion between the opposite arises from strong social inter-
actions that dictate cohesion between the like opinions.
Another important observation here is that the transi-
tion is driven primarily by the increase of emotional level
while the other parameters (conformity, confidence) stay
constant. We should stress that the source of and the
original direction of the emotional agents were not cru-
cial. The key properties of the model that determine the
nature of the steady states (non-polar, polar or bipolar)
9are the high conformity and strongly bounded confidence.
V. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the opinion dynamics over a recent
period of political unrest in Ukraine. Based on the Twit-
ter data, we registered an onset of emotional intensity
of tweets that corresponded to rising levels of involve-
ment of the population in the political feud, fueled by
the action of the government, collisions of the opposing
groups, and foreign military activities. The escalating
opinion divide around the time became apparent among
others in the jump of the opinion bimodality index. We
proposed an agent-based lattice model to study political
polarization as a collective behavior including the spatial
dimension of polarization. By parameterizing the model
with Twitter data at distinct time points, we predicted
the onset of collective behavior and territorial splitting
of the opinion. We demonstrated that the tendency of
territorial splitting is conditioned by the high conformity
and homophily in the society and is driven by the growth
in emotional intensity. Our analyzes demonstrate clearly
the importance of emotional intensity for polarization, a
factor that has been largely ignored thus far in classic
theoretical and empirical literature on polarization with
a few noteworthy exceptions as discussed earlier. Specifi-
cally, while our analyzes confirm the importance of social
comparison, homophily, persuasive argument and biased
assimilation mechanisms and their specific interactions
for polarization, they also show that these mechanisms
are not sufficient to ignite the extreme societal polariza-
tion we can observe for instance in Ukraine. The emo-
tional intensity is a key reinforcement mechanism that
has to be added.
Our analysis seem also to suggest a link between polar-
ization and separatist trends. The polarization dynamics
that we establish for February 2014 in the data and sim-
ulation increases in fact further around April and May
2014, when the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk Peo-
ple’s Republics were formed in the South-East of Ukraine.
This seems to suggest that the opinion split may facili-
tate the separatist trends on its own. The observed phe-
nomenon is not unique to Ukraine, and similar processes
of deepening polarization leading to separatism are well
known elsewhere (e.g. Northern Ireland). In most cases,
however, the separatism is related to more obvious eth-
nic, racial, or religious differences between the commu-
nities, while in Ukraine the division is more subtle and
roots in small cultural differences, which were artificially
enhanced by external factors. And our results show how
dangerous targeted agitation can be when it is backed
by modern information warfare techniques [56, 57] as it
boils emotions making polarized world views increasingly
irreconcilable.
Ethics
Tweets were collected and analysed in accordance with
the Twitter Privacy Policy and the Twitter Terms of Ser-
vice.
Data accessibility
The datasets supporting the conclusions of this article
are provided by the Archive Team [47].
Authors’ contributions
MR: Development and Testing of the Bounded Con-
fidence XY Model, Parametrization and Testing of the
Model with Twitter Data, Development of Ukrainian dic-
tionary for sentiment analysis, Preparing graphics, Writ-
ing the paper, VS: Processing and Analyzing Twitter
data, Preparing graphics, Writing the paper, TI: Devel-
opment of the Bounded Confidence XY Model, Writing
the paper, VL: Development of the Bounded Confidence
XY Model, Writing the paper.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Ian Harper for help with program-
ming and testing of the web applet.
[1] James Bell, Katie Simmons, and Russ Oates. De-
spite concerns about governance, Ukrainians want
to remain one country. Pew Research Center.
http://www.webcitation.org/6qqM20kvf, 2014. Ac-
cessed on: 30 May 2017.
[2] European Commission. Humanitarian Air and
Civil Protection. Ukraine. ECHO Factsheet.
http://www.webcitation.org/70SmHLcRn, 2016. Ac-
cessed on: 30 May 2017.
[3] BBC. Ukraine’s sharp divisions.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26387353,
2014. Accessed on: 30 May 2017.
[4] Ukraine’s 2001 census. http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua.
Accessed on: 14 Aug 2017.
[5] Dirk Helbing and Stefano Balietti. How
to do agent-based simulations in the future:
From modeling social mechanisms to emer-
gent phenomena and interactive systems design.
http://www.santafe.edu/media/workingpapers/11-06-024.pdf,
2011. Accessed on: 30 May 2017.
[6] Mark Birkin and Nick Malleson. Investigating
the behaviour of Twitter users to construct an
individual-level model of metropolitan dynamics.
http://www.webcitation.org/70SmCQuDQ, 2012. Ac-
10
cessed on: 26 June 2018.
[7] Emilio Serrano, Carlos A. Iglesias, and Mercedes Garijo.
A novel agent-based rumor spreading model in Twitter. In
Proceedings of the International World Wide Web Confer-
ence (IW3C2), 2015.
[8] William Rand, Jeffrey Herrmann, Brandon Schein, and
Nezˇa Vodopivec. An agent-based model of urgent diffusion
in social media. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social
Simulation, 18(2):DOI: 10.18564/jasss.2616, 2015.
[9] Bruno Gon¸alves, Nicola Perra, and Alessandro Vespig-
nani. Modeling users’ activity on Twitter networks: Val-
idation of dunbar’s number. PLOS ONE, 6(8):1–5, 08
2011.
[10] L. Weng, A. Flammini, A. Vespignani, and F. Menczer.
Competition among memes in a world with limited atten-
tion. Scientific Reports, 2:00335, 03 2012.
[11] Misako Takayasu, Kazuya Sato, Yukie Sano, Kenta Ya-
mada, Wataru Miura, and Hideki Takayasu. Rumor diffu-
sion and convergence during the 3.11 earthquake: A Twit-
ter case study. PLOS ONE, 10(4):1–18, 04 2015.
[12] Elizabeth Suhay. Explaining group influence: The role
of identity and emotion in political conformity and polar-
ization. Political Behavior, 37(1):221–251, 2015.
[13] Daniel J. Isenberg. Group polarization: A critical review
and meta-analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 50(6):1141–1151, 1986.
[14] Serge Moscovici and Marisa Zavalloni. The group as a
polarizer of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 12(2):125–135, 1969.
[15] Morris H. DeGroot. Reaching a consensus. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 69(345):118–121, 1974.
[16] Cass R. Sunstein. The law of group polarization. The
Journal of Political Philosophy, 10(2):175–195, 2002.
[17] Robert S. Baron and Gard Roper. Reaffirmation of social
comparison views of choice shifts: Averaging and extrem-
ity effects in an autokinetic situation. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 33(5):521–530, 1976.
[18] David G. Myers, Sandra Brown Wojcicki, and Bobette S.
Aardema. Attitude comparison: Is there ever a band-
wagon effect? Journal of Applied Social Psychology,
7(4):341–347, 1977.
[19] Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M.
Cook. Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks.
Annual Review of Sociology, 27:415–444, 2001.
[20] Sergio Currarini, Matthew O. Jackson, and Paolo Pin.
An economic model of friendship: Homophily, minorities,
and segregation. Econometrica, 77(4):1003–1045, 2009.
[21] Pranav Dandekar, Ashish Goel, and David T. Lee. Biased
assimilation, homophily, and the dynamics of polarization.
PNAS, 110(15):5791–5796, 2013.
[22] Eugene Bernstein. Persuasion as argument processing.
In Hermann Brandstatter, James H. Davis, and Gisela
Stocker-Kreichgauer, editors, Contemporary problems in
group decision-making, pages 103–124. NewYork: Aca-
demic Press, 1982.
[23] Ebbe B. Ebbsen and Richard J. Bowers. Proportion of
risky to conservative arguments in a group discussion and
choice shifts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 29(3):316–327, 1974.
[24] Amiram Vinokur and Eugene Bernstein. Novel argumen-
tation and attitude change: The case of polarization fol-
lowing group discussion. European Journal of Social Psy-
chology, 8(3):335–348, 1978.
[25] Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper. Biased
assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior
theories on subsequently considered evidence. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(11):2098–2109,
1979.
[26] Arthur G. Miller, John W. McHoskey, Cynthia M. Bane,
and Timothy G. Dowd. The attitude polarization phe-
nomenon: Role of response measure, attitude extremity,
and behavioral consequences of reported attitude change.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(4):561–
574, 1993.
[27] Geoffrey D. Munro, Peter H. Ditto, Lisa K. Lockhart,
Angela Fagerlin, Mitchell Gready, and Elizabeth Peterson.
Biased assimilation of sociopolitical arguments: Evaluat-
ing the 1996 U.S. presidential debate. Basic and Applied
Social Psychology, 24(1):15–26, 2002.
[28] Charles S. Taber and Milton Lodge. Motivated skepti-
cism in the evaluation of political beliefs. American Jour-
nal of Political Science, 50(3):755–769, 2006.
[29] Wayne E. Baker. America’s Crisis of Values: Reality and
Perception. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2005.
[30] Michael Dimock, Carroll Doherty, Jocelyn Ki-
ley, and Russ Oates. Political polarization
in the American public. Pew Research Center.
http://www.webcitation.org/70SlevVb7, 2014. Ac-
cessed on: 26 June 2018.
[31] Delia Baldassarri and Peter Bearman. Dynamics of
political polarization. American Sociological Review,
72(5):784–811, 2007.
[32] Claudio Castellano, Santo Fortunato, and Vittorio
Loreto. Statistical physics of social dynamics. Reviews
of Modern Physics, 81(2):591–646, 2009.
[33] Michael Ma¨s, Andreas Flache, Ka´roly Taka´cs, and
Karen A. Jehn. In the short term we divide, in the long
term we unite: Demographic crisscrossing and the effects
of faultilines on subgroup polarization. Organization Sci-
ence, 24(3):716–736, 2013.
[34] Guillaume Deffuant, David Neau, Frederic Amblard,
and Ge´rard Weisbuch. Mixing beliefs among interacting
agents. Advances in Complex Systems, 3:87–98, 2000.
[35] Rainer Hegselmann and Ulrich Krause. Opinion dynam-
ics and bounded confidence models, analysis, and simula-
tion. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation,
5(3):1, 2002.
[36] Santo Fortunato, Vito Latora, Alessa Ndro Pluchino,
and Andrea Rapisarda. Vector opinion dynamics in a
bounded confidence consensus model. International Jour-
nal of Modern Physics C, 16(10):1535, 2005.
[37] Jan Lorenz. Continuous opinion dynamics under
bounded confidence: A survey. International Journal of
Modern Physics C, 18(12):1819, 2007.
[38] Eytan Bakshy, Solomon Messing, and Lada Adamic. Ex-
posure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Face-
book. Science, 348(6239):1130–1132, 2015.
[39] Michael D. Conover, Jacob Ratkiewicz, Matthew Fran-
cisco, Bruno Goncalves, Filippo Menczer, and Alessandro
Flammini. Political polarization on twitter. In Fifth Inter-
national AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media,
pages 89–96, 2011.
[40] Sarita Yardi and Danah Boyd. Dynamic debates: An
analysis of group polarization over time on twitter. Bul-
letin of Science, Technology & Society, 30(5):316–327,
2010.
[41] Molly Asher, Cristina Leston Bandeira, and Vikto-
11
ria Spaiser. Assessing the effectiveness of e-petitioning
through Twitter conversations. In Political Studies Asso-
ciation Annual Meeting 2017, 2017.
[42] Anatoliy Gruzd and Ksenia Tsyganova. Politically po-
larized online groups and their social structures formed
around the 2013–2014 crisis in Ukraine. Internet, Poli-
tics, Policy 2014: Crowdsourcing for Politics and Policy.,
2014.
[43] David Stern. The Twitter war: So-
cial media’s role in Ukraine unrest.
http://www.webcitation.org/70Slybzp7, 2014. Ac-
cessed on: 26 June 2018.
[44] Alexander Ronzhyn. The use of facebook and Twitter
during the 2013-2014 protests in ukraine. In Proceedings
of the European Conference on Social Media: ECSM 2014,
2014.
[45] Elanor Colleoni, Alessandro Rozza, and Adam Arvids-
son. Echo chamber or public sphere? Predicting political
orientation and measuring political homophily in Twitter
using Big Data. Journal of Communication, 64(2):317–
332, 2014.
[46] Pablo Barbera´. Birds of the same feather tweet together:
Bayesian ideal point estimation using Twitter data. Po-
litical Analysis, 23(1):76–91, 2015.
[47] Archive Team: The Twitter Stream Grab.
https://archive.org/details/twitterstream . Ac-
cessed on: 30 May 2017.
[48] Mi Kyung Lee, Ho Young Yoon, Marc Smith, Hye Jin
Park, and Han Woo Park. Mapping a twitter scholarly
communication network: a case of the association of inter-
net researchers’ conference. Scientometrics, 112(2):767–
797, 2017.
[49] Tamas Vicsek, Andras Cziro´k, Eshel Ben-Jacob, Inon
Cohen, and Ofer Shochet. Novel type of phase transi-
tion in a system of self-driven particles. Physical Review
Letters, 75:1226–1229, 1995.
[50] Maksym Romensky, Vladimir Lobaskin, and Thomas
Ihle. Tricritical points in a vicsek model of self-propelled
particles with bounded confidence. Physical Review E,
90:063315, 2014.
[51] Bounded Confidence XY Model: Online Simulator.
http://maksymromensky.com/bounded_confidence_xy_model.
Accessed on: 24 June 2018.
[52] Pawel Sobkowicz. Discrete model of opinion changes us-
ing knowledge and emotions as control variables. PLoS
ONE, 7(9):1–16, 09 2012.
[53] Pawel Sobkowicz. Minority persistence in agent based
model using information and emotional arousal as control
variables. The European Physical Journal B, 86(7):335,
2013.
[54] Viktoria Spaiser, Thomas Chadefaux, Karsten Donnay,
Fabian Russmann, and Dirk Helbing. Communication
power struggles on social media: A case study of the 2011-
12 Russian protests. Journal of Information Technology &
Politics, 14(2):132–153, 2017.
[55] Julie Ray. Ukrainians disillusioned with leadership.
http://www.webcitation.org/70Sm5d0YG, 2015. Ac-
cessed on: 30 May 2017.
[56] Christina Cottiero, Katherine Kucharski, Evgenia
Olimpieva, and Robert W. Orttung. War of words: the
impact of russian state television on the russian internet.
Nationalities Papers, 43(4):533–555, 2015.
[57] Jessikka Aro. The cyberspace war: propaganda and
trolling as warfare tools. European View, 15(1):121–132,
2016.
1Supplementary Material for: Polarized Ukraine 2014: Opinion and Territorial Split
Demonstrated with the Bounded Confidence XY Model, Parameterized by Twitter
Data
Maksym Romenskyy,1,2 Viktoria Spaiser,3 Thomas Ihle,4 Vladimir Lobaskin5
1Department of Life Sciences, Imperial College London, London SW7 2AZ, UK 2Department of Mathematics,
Uppsala University, Box 480, Uppsala 75106, Sweden 3School of Politics and International Studies, University of
Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK 4Institute of Physics, University of Greifswald, Felix-Hausdorff-Str. 6, Greifswald 17489,
Germany 5School of Physics, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland
(Dated: July 26, 2018)
Supplementary Methods
Further Model Specifications
Supplementary Figure S1 illustrates interactions in the Bounded Confidence XY model. The red opinion vector
interacts with its 24 neighbors located within two nearest lattice nodes in any direction r = 2. In this illustration,
each of the 24 neighbors has orientation relative to the focal (red) vector less than α and therefore all 24 agents
contribute to future orientation of the focal vector. For simplicity, all vectors in Supplementary Fig. S1 are shown to
have same length. In all simulations, the initial orientations of all agents except the ones at the system’s boundary
were drawn randomly from the uniform distribution in the interval [−pi, pi].
α
Figure S1: The interaction parameters in the Bounded Confidence XY model with r = 2. The focal opinion vector (red arrow)
interacts only with those neighbors whose relative orientation is less or equal to α and who are located within the two nearest
rows/columns (blue arrows).
To quantify formation of territorially isolated domains in our model, we performed a simple cluster analysis. We
define a cluster based on two criteria: distance and relative orientation between the agents. Therefore, a cluster is
a set of connected agents, each of which is within the cutoff distance (defined by r) from one or more other opinion
vectors from the same cluster and a relative orientation between any two neighbors in the cluster is less or equal to
restriction angle α. Conversely, two agents will not belong to the same cluster, if there is no continuous path on the
neighbor network leading from the first agent to the second or if this path is broken because the angle between two
neighbors is larger than α and hence the opinion vectors do not interact. For each update step we calculated size of
each cluster, maximal cluster size and total number of clusters.
We characterised orientational ordering in our model using two order parameters. Polar order parameter was used
to quantify the average degree of opinion agreement between the agents
ϕ =
1
N
∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
exp(ıθj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (S1)
2Figure S2: Phase behavior of the Bounded Confidence XY model. (A) Phase diagrams based on polar ϕ and bipolar Q
order parameters for the model system without and with parameterization by Twitter data. (B) Combined phase diagrams
for the model system without and with parameterization by Twitter data showing regions of dominance of polar and bipolar
order. (C) Phase diagrams based on polar ϕ and bipolar Q order parameters for non-parameterized model system at different
simulation parameters (see legend). (D) Combined phase diagrams showing regions of dominance of polar and bipolar order
for unparameterized model system at different simulation parameters (see legend). The red plus marker denotes simulation
parameters α and η for the parameterized version of the model used throughout the paper. In plots C and D, s denotes size of
a side of a square lattice; E stands for East and means that all boundary spins are fixed to the right (θ = 0), W −E stands for
West – East and means that the boundary spins on the left and on top are fixed to the left (θ = pi) and the boundary spins on
the right and on the bottom are fixed to the right (θ = 0); r denotes the interaction range.
where ı is the imaginary unit and θj is the direction of each vector j. This order parameter turns zero in the isotropic
phase, when opinions of all agents are very different from each other, and assumes finite positive values in the ordered
phase, reaching unity when global consensus settles in.
To characterise opinion polarization in our model we use the following bipolar order parameter
Q =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
N
N∑
j=1
exp(ı2θj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (S2)
When the two vectors are oriented perfectly collinearly, Q = 1. Note that a perfectly polarly ordered phase is
characterized by ϕ = Q = 1, as the polar ordering implies the bipolar ordering. A bipolarly ordered phase requires
only Q = 1 while the polar order parameter can take any value ϕ < 1. Therefore, requirements for the polar order
are more restrictive.
For each weekly distribution of opinions, both for the Twitter data and in simulations, we computed the bimodality
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Figure S3: (A) Panel Twitter users (black dots) in the pro-against-European (West)/pro-against-Russian (East) opinion space,
data from first week in October 2013. (B) Panel Twitter users (black dots) in the pro-against-European (West)/pro-against-
Russian (East) opinion space, data from first week in September 2014.
coefficient (see main text, Methods) by first calculating the skewness and kurtosis of the distribution. Skewness is
defined as the third standardised moment around the mean
γ =
µ3
µ
3/2
2
, (S3)
where µ2 and µ3 are the second and the third cumulants, respectively. Kurtosis is computed as the fourth central
moment
k =
µ4
µ22
, (S4)
where µ2 and µ4 are the second and the fourth cumulants, respectively.
The model phase diagrams, shown in Supplementary Figs. S2 A-D, demonstrate three different steady states of
the system. The high noise (low conformity) generally corresponds to a globally disordered behavior (without any
prominent consensus or polarization). The region of disordered behavior shrinks as the restriction angle α is increased
(Supplementary Fig. S2 A). The lesser restriction leads to more interactions between the nearest neighbours and to the
onset of order (consensus). At lower noise, below the transition line we observe either polar or bipolar structuring of the
system (Supplementary Fig. S2 B). The range of higher α allows only states with global consensus, while at α < 0.4pi
we see the region of prevalence of the bipolar polarized states. In other words, the polarized states are only possible
at low noise (high conformity) and small restriction angles (strongly bounded confidence). The change in level of
emotional intensity pushes the boundary between the polarized and non-polarized societies outwards (Supplementary
Fig. S2 B), thus extending the range of the polarized states, and brings the originally weakly polarized society to a
highly polarized one. The most important observation here is that the transition happens just due to the increase of
emotional intensity while the other parameters (conformity, confidence) stay constant. Supplementary Figures S2 C,D
show phase diagrams for unparameterized systems at different simulation parameters. For a larger system, s = 240
constituting of 58081 agents, the area of bipolar ordering is slightly reduced as compared to the standard system size
(s = 120) used in this study. The shrinking happens because the influence of biased boundary vectors is decreased
due to larger system size. If the agents have larger interaction range, r = 3 (i.e. each vectors interacts with up to 48
nearest neighbors), the region of bipolar ordering expands to larger restriction angles and noise values because longer
correlation range becomes possible and effect of the boundary bias is more pronounced at these conditions. Finally,
if all boundary vectors are fixed in one direction (in this case to the East, θ = 0), the area of bipolar polarization
shrinks significantly but does not disappear. At these conditions bipolar ordering also displays more sensitivity with
respect to noise than to restriction angle.
Twitter Data
The archived Twitter Streaming API Spritzer Sample tweet data was stored in JSON (JavaScript Oobject
Notation) file format, which is the most common open standard data format to transmit data objects in asyn-
chronous browser/server communication. The data was then processed and analyzed in Python using the Python
Natural Language Text Processing Toolkit (NLTK) [S1, S2]. NTLK is a collection of various classes, interfaces and
functions for natural language processing, including important text mining methods. It was developed at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania and is widely used in computational linguistics, machine learning, and cognitive science (see in
particular https://nltk.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/doc/api/index.html).
4The collected tweets were filtered, first for Russian and Ukrainian language, identifying respective alphabet char-
acters in the tweet text. Tweets, where Twitter users specified being from Russia or any region/town in Russia were
removed from the data. We also filtered for SPAM tweets (around 17% of all the tweets in our data), using the following
keywords, based on word count analyses: porn, phone, games, androidgames, minecraft, ipadgames, loosing weight, gold,
mtvstars, crossword, barbie, sony, holidays, shop, TV series, volkswagen, sales, starlet, apartments, estate, bmw, mercedes,
sex, happysex, viagra, stock, prostitutes, teen, price, diet, buy, credit in English, Ukrainian and Russian language. Tweets
containing these words were removed from the data. Furthermore, we filtered the data for political context with an
extensive set of keywords to remove irrelevant tweets and therefore unnecessary noise from the data: protest, mobiliza-
tion, Ukraine, kiborgi, glory to the heroes (one word hashtag in Ukrainian and Russian - geroiamslava), junta, government,
duma, kremlin, parliament, rada, premier ministry, president, minister, ministry, political action, demonstration, opposition,
power, authorities, democracy, nationalists, communists, liberals, Putin, Poroshenko, political party, politics, politicians,
political, policy, revolution, citizen, criticism, critics, agitation, sanctions, censoring, illegal, legal, solidarity, assembly, rally,
law, regulation, resistance, civil disobedience, resist, reforms, communism, capitalism, administration, news, society, viola-
tion, RNBO, Iaijtheniukh, ukr, ukry, khokhly, okraina, ruina, raguli, poproshenko, papashenko, papasha, bacon to the heroes
(a wordplay in Russian with glory to the heroes - geroiamsala), civil war, nazis, Bandera, banderlogi, bandery, banderovtsy,
benderovets, visitka Iarosha, titushki, EuroMaidan, U revolution, peaceful march, radio freedom, inforesist, Aronets, av-
tomaijdan, Ukraine truth news (one word hashtag), SOS Maidan (one word hashtag), digital Maidan (one word hashtag),
Maidan history (one word hashtag), sidemaidan, Maidan, freedom, Ukrainian, NATO for Ukraine (one word hashtag), will,
choice, against, anti-Maidan, ukrop, Europe, USA, Kiev, Timoshenko, Cameron, dead, killed, negotiations, military service,
Zakharchenko, police, Obama, war, activists, right sector, Azarov, upper, leader, Jatseniuk, Turchinov, Klitchko, MID,
Nayyem, briginets, constitution, Avakov, MVD, Yushenko, Kuchma, Kravchuk, Kharkov, Grushevskogo, warriors, soldiers,
prisoners, Euro, EU, military, Sloviansk, army, West, East, Mariupol, reconciliations, NATO, ATO, crimealook, conflict,
Medvedchuk, Medvedchukov, geo-politics, confrontation, Strasbourg, crisis, Lutsenko, Tusk, peace, world, Vladimirova,
Vladimir, relations, unity, national, help, oligarchs, glory to Ukraine (one word hashtag), hundred, over, own will, self-
determination, power, annexion, annexing, separatism, separatist, rebels, freedom fighters, freedom fight, moskali (meaning
Moscow sympathizers), [Russian] official, Putin khujlo (offensive word, one word hashtag), luganda, lungandon, daunbas,
zrada, occupants, MGB, Zakhar, Russian peace (one word hashtag), Russian world (one word hashtag), Putin is murder
(one word hashtag), Putler, Putin help (one word hashtag), putinism, insurgents, insurgency, small/so what Russia, Crimea
is ours (one word hashtag), At least Crimea is our (one word hashtag), punitive, ptnpnkh, ptn, pnkh, vata, vatnik, glory to
Russia (one word hashtag), Russia, provocation, Novorossiia, DNR, LNR, berkut, kiberberkut, glory, stopcrimeantatarsgeno-
cide, russiainvadeukraine, russiaviolatedceasefire, stoprussianaggression, weapon, Russian, Medvedev, Moscow, legislation,
Yanukovich, truth, Donetsk, Luhansk, Russian march (one word hashtag), Russians, Ukrainians, Non-russians, Navalny,
monument, Lenin, western, eastern, geek, Lavrov, grad, humanitarian, anti-Russian, SSSR, Donbass, Bafana, elections,
legislator, fire, Mirakova, ukraintsami, radio, Putin supporters (one word hashtag), Ukraine France, Zakharov, Mironov in
Ukrainian and Russian language. Tweets that contained at least one of these keywords were kept in the filtered data,
otherwise removed.
Any analysis of Twitter data faces a number of well-known difficulties [S3]. Some of them, e.g. the SPAM tweet
problems, we have addressed already above. One potential problem is that the sample only includes public tweets
from public Twitter accounts. This does not pose a problem in the context of our study though, since we are
interested in the use of Twitter as an instrument of communication in the public sphere. Moreover, Twitter data is
not representative, which again is rather unproblematic for our study because all political groups and their supporters
are represented on Twittersphere, so the public debate on Twitter does overall mirror the general public debate and
public opinions [S4, S5]. Another potential issue is that the sample is based solely on the 1% of all public tweets,
which for instance makes it difficult to use the data as panel data (though we’ve done this to probe opinion changes
within individuals, see Supplementary Fig. S3, the number of observations is however drastically reduced). However,
other Twitter data samples offered by Twitter (e.g. Gardenhose with 10% of all pubic tweets) have to be purchased,
which makes them often unaffordable for research purposes.
One aspect of Twitter data ”richness” is that it is supposedly geo-referenced. However, as already mentioned in
the main manuscript quite a large proportion of Twitter users do in fact not provide any geographical information.
Frequently, even if ”geo enabled” was activated by the Twitter user (thus the value was set to ”true”), the actual
”geo” or ”place” ”coordinates” value would be ”null” because the device that was used to post the tweet had no
geo-referencing (e.g. GPS) activated. The data that the user provides through the profile ”location” tag is more often
available, however, here we have to rely on the accuracy and honesty of the Twitter users. Moreover, if the information
provided through ”location” was imprecise, e.g. just ”Ukraine”, we could not use this information for plotting. Did
we however have serious and specific information from the user, e.g. ”Kiev”, then we used that information to
generate a longitude and a latitude coordinate value that we could then plot on a generated Ukraine map in Fig.
3C,D in the main manuscript. We deliberately ignored another potential geographical information, the ”time zone”,
because it offers only imprecise geographical information. Overall, we could extract form the Twitter data of the last
5September week 2014 493 Twitter users for whom we had sufficiently precise geographical data. This data along with
the calculated West and East scores were used to produce the Figures 3C and D in the main manuscript.
Twitter Data Analysis
In order to understand the empirical polarization dynamic in Ukraine and furthermore in order to make the data
usable for model calibration, it was necessary to identify the political opinion of the Twitter users in our data. First,
we identified the Twitter users in our Twitter data based on the value of their ”screen name”. We then compiled two
lists of keywords, extracted from the word count analysis of the most common words that contain words associated
with either the pro-East political camp or the pro-West political camp: annexion: -2 , annexing: -2, separatism: -2,
moskali (meaning Moscow sympathizers): -2, [Russian] official: -2, Putin khuijlo (one word hashtag): -3, Luganda: -3,
Lugandon: -3, Daunbas: -3, zrada: -2, insurgents: -2, occupants: -2, MGB: 1, Zakhar: 1, Russian peace (one word
hashtag): -2, Putin is murder (one word hashtag): -3, Putler: -3, Putin help (one word hashtag): 2, putinism: -1, freedom
fighters (one word): 2, freedom fight (one word): 2, small/so what Russia: 2, Crimea is ours (one word hashtag): 3, At
least Crimea is ours (one word hashtag): 3, punitive: 3, ptnpnkh: -3, ptn: -1, pnkh: -3, vata: -3, vatnik: -3, glory to
Russia: 3, Russia: 0, Russian: 0, Russians: 0, provocation: 0, separatist: -3, separatism: -3, Novorossiia: 2, DNR: 1, LNR:
1, sanctions: 1, berkut: 1, kiberberkut: 1, stopcrimeantatarsgenocide: -3, russiainvadedukraine: -3, russiaviolatedceasefire:
-3, anti-Russian sanctions (one word hashtag): 2, stoprussianaggression: -3, peace: 0, Putin: 0, weapon: 0, Medvedev:
0, Crimea: 0, Moscow: 0, Yanukovich: 0, truth: 0, Donetsk: 0, from Lugansk (one word): 0, Russian march (one word
hashtag): 0, Non-Russians: 0, dead/killed: 0, negotiations: 0, politce: 0, rebels: 0, Lugansk: 0, war: 0, duma: 0, Mockva:
-1, government: 0, leader: 0, monument: 1, Lenin: 1, warriors: 0, prisonerns: 0, military: 0, East: 0, army: 0, relations:
0, soldier: 0, reconciliations: 0, geek: -2, Lavrov: 0, grad: -1, humanitarian: 1, anti-Russian: 2, SSSR: 1, Donbass:
0, Bafana: 0, elections: 1, referendum: 0, confrontation: 0, fire: 0, crisis: 0, conflict: 0, Putin supporters (one word
hashtag): -1, Mironov: 0 were the keywords for the East political camp and mobilization: 1, kiborgi: 2, unity: 1, glory
to the heroes (one word hashtag): 3, RNBO: 1, Iaijtheniukh: -3, junta: -2, ukr: -3, ukry: -3, khokhly: -1, okraina: -1,
Ruina: -3, raguli: -3, poproshenko: -2, Papashenko: -2, papasha: -3, bacon to the heroes (a wordplay in Russian with
glory to the heroes - geroiamsala): -3, civil war (one word hashtag):- 2, visit Kaiarosha (one word hashtag): 2, nazis: -3,
Bandera: -3, banderlogi: -3, bandery: -3, banderovtsy: -3, titushki: 2, Ukraine: 0, Euro Maidan (one word hashtag): 1,
U REVOLUTION: 2, peaceful march (one word hashtag): 1, radio freedom (one word hashtag): 1, inforesist: 1, Aronets:
1, avtomaijdan: 1, Ukrainian truth news (one word hashtag): 1, SOS Maidan (one word hashtag): 1, digital Maidan (one
word hashtag): 1, Maidan history (one word hashtag): 1, sitemaidan:1, Maidan: 0, freedom:1, government: 1, Ukrainian:
0, Urkrainians: 0, NATO for Ukraine (one word hashtag): 2, will: 2, will: self-determination, against: 2, revolution: 2,
anti-Maidan:- 2, ukrop: -3, Poroshenko: 0, Europe: 0, USA: 0, Kiev: 0, weapon: 0, Timoshenko: 0, truth: 0, Cameron:
0, democracy: 0, dead/killed: 0, negotiations: 0, military service: 0, Zakharchenko: 0, opposition: 0, Obama: 0, war:
0, parliament: 0, activists: 0, political action (one word): 0, protest: 0, sector: 0, Azarov: 0, upper: 0, leader: 0, rada:
0, Yatseniuk: 0, Turchinov: 0, Klichko: 0, MID: 0, Nayyem: 0, Briginets: 0, constitution: 0, president: 0, Avakov: 0,
MVD: 0, Yushchenko: 0, Kuchma: 0, Kravchuk: 0, Kharkov: 0, Grushevskogo: 0, warriors: 0, Euro: 0, EU: 0, military:
0, Slaviansk: 0, West: 0, western: 0, army: 0, soldier: 0, Mariupol: 0, reconciliations: 0, NATO: 0, ATO: 1, conflict: 0,
Medvedchuk: 0, Medvedchukvv: 0, Strasbourg: 0, crisis: 0, Lutsenko: 0 ,Tusk: 0, peace: 0, relations: 0, national: 1, help:
1, glory to Ukraine (one word hashtag): 2, hundred: 2, over: 2, power: 2, BENDERovets: 3, civil war: -2, krimealook:
1, Ukraine France: 1 were the keywords for the West political camp. These keywords were scored between -3 and
3, with negative scores indicating negative attitudes towards the respective political camp, positive values positive
attitudes and a zero a neutral opinion. Some keywords were unambiguously associated with a political affiliation. For
instance, the word ”Putler” (scored -3), a composition of Putin and Hitler, is clearly a negatively annotated word
referencing the East political camp. Similarly, the word ”banderovtsy” (scored -3) linking the West political camp to
Stepan Bandera, leader of the Ukrainian nationalist and independence movement during the Second World War, who
cooperated with Nazi Germany, shows clearly a strong disapproval of the West political camp. On the other hand
the hashtag #slavarossii (translated: Glory to Russia, scored +3), shows a clear support for the East political camp,
while the hashtag #natoforukraine (scored +3) expresses an unequivocal pro-Western political affiliation. A word
like ”Putin” (East political camp) or ”Poroshenko” (West political camp) however would be assigned a ”0” because
depending on the remaining content of the tweet the names could have been associated with positive or negative
attitudes. And for that reason an additional sentiment analysis of the tweets was necessary.
We used the sentiment analysis SentiStrength (http://sentistrength.wlv.ac.uk) approach to determine a sen-
timent score for each tweet. SentiStrength is a free Java-based automatic sentiment analysis tool, widely used in
research, which is also available for the Russian language. We created a comprehensive dictionary for Ukrainian
sentiment words (to be shared upon request) based on the SentiStrength sentiment scoring system and we reviewed
the sentiment word dictionary that SentiStrength is using for the Russian language and complemented it with other
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Figure S4: (A) Time series plot of absolute skewness for opinion distributions in Twitter data. (B) Time series plot of absolute
skewness for opinion distributions in simulations. (C) Kurtosis of the distribution of opinions in Twitter data. (D) Kurtosis of
the distribution of opinions in simulations. Simulation parameters in plots B and D are α = 0.15 and η = 0.12.
sentiment words (among others offensive words that were missing in SentiStrength) to make it equivalent to the
Ukrainian dictionary. The sentiment scores in SentiStrength and thus in our two sentiment words dictionaries range
from -5 to +5 with 0 signifying a neutral word, negative values a negative sentiment and positive values a positive
sentiment. The higher the absolute value the stronger the sentiment. For each tweet we calculated a sentiment score
average based on the identified sentiment words in the tweet. We calculated a separate sentiment score for the East
political camp related keywords and one for the West political camp related keywords. The emotional intensity score
is averaging these two sentiment scores.
In the case of unequivocal keyword tweets, the tweet score would derive from these keywords. For instance, if a
keyword contained the words ”Putler” (scored -3) and the hashtag ”stoprussianaggression” (scored -3), the tweet score
would be the average of these two scores, thus -3. Whenever a tweet was scored zero because of neutral keywords, we
added to the score the respective sentiment score. Thus if an East political camp related tweet had a zero score (e.g.
”Putin”), and the East political camp related sentiment score was -2 (for instance resulting from the sentiment word
”zachvatil” (translated: grabbed)), then the tweet would get an East political affiliation score of -2. This is based
on the assumption that users would express positive sentiments about terms associated with their own camp and/or
negative sentiments towards terms associated with the other camp. Since most users would have posted several tweets,
users were assigned a set of tweet scores, depending on the number of tweets and from these scores overall average
scores, one East score, one West score, were calculated for each user, representing their political affiliation
Automatic classification and sentiment analysis have certainly their limitations, e.g. automatic sentiment analysis
often fail to spot irony and classifications do not account for instance for complex inner-fraction dynamics, that is
political fractions within political fractions. However, manual classification is becoming increasingly impossible with
the growing amount of data and/or limited capacities and resources and thus automatic classification is increasingly
applied. It is however important to work on further developing and elaborating these tools and to supervise, critically
reflect and where required correct the process of automatic analysis and its outcomes.
7Additional Results
We present here some additional results that support our main conclusions in the manuscript. Supplementary
Figure S4 shows the skewness and kurtosis of opinions in the Twitter data and computer simulation. These plots
show again the discontinuity of political opinions in the Ukrainian Twittersphere, with jumps in February 2014.
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